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Abstract
Inter-enterprise collaboration has become essential for the success of enterprises. As competition
increasingly takes place between supply chains and networks of enterprises, there is a strategic
business need to participate in multiple collaborations simultaneously. Collaborations based on
an open market of autonomous actors set special requirements for computing facilities supporting
the setup and management of these business networks of enterprises. Currently, the safeguards
against privacy threats in collaborations crossing organizational borders are both insufficient and
incompatible to the open market. A broader understanding is needed of the architecture of defense
structures, and privacy threats must be detected not only on the level of a private person or enter-
prise, but on the community and ecosystem levels as well. Control measures must be automated
wherever possible in order to keep the cost and effort of collaboration management reasonable.
This article contributes to the understanding of the modern inter-enterprise collaboration environ-
ment and privacy threats in it, and presents the automated control measures required to ensure that
actors in inter-enterprise collaborations behave correctly to preserve privacy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Inter-enteprise collaboration involves a group of enterprises working together for a joint goal. Each
enteprise offers a specific service, such as transporting goods, managing customer payments, or
order handling. These services fulfil roles in a business network, with a predefined joint process
and goals. The collaboration is regulated by a shared contract.
As competition increasingly takes place between supply chains and networks of enterprises,
service providers have a strategic business need to participate in multiple collaborations simul-
taneously. They expect to easily compose new collaborations from services in the open service
market, and need to manage these constructs while respecting both regulation and the autonomy of
collaboration partners. Control measures must be automated wherever possible, in order to keep
the cost and effort of collaboration management reasonable.
Collaborations based on an open market of autonomous service providers set special require-
ments for computing facilities supporting the setup and management of these business networks
of enterprises. New threats emerge in the fields of data security and enterprise-level privacy.
We define privacy as the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for them-
selves, when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others [35]. In
other words, the subject of privacy can either be a person, a group of people, or a formal orga-
nization under which people and groups cooperate. In the inter-enterprise collaboration context,
privacy appears on four levels: private people, the enterprise, the collaboration, and the entire
service ecosystem.
Cross-organizational privacy-enhancing technologies and standards are sorely needed, as part-
nering makes more and more data being shared between organizations [20]. Many proposed solu-
tions for collaborations are based on a closed set of strategic partners who are “already known”,
and rely on forming a single domain of trust [36, 18, 24]. Gaining membership in the trusted
virtual breeding environment is no real guarantee that the enterprise partner will behave well and
follow shared norms in the future. The research challenge of security and privacy management is
far from solved from the data management viewpoint; solutions are needed for policy definition
and enforcement, monitoring and the negotiation of joint policies, such as contracts [14].
We aim to fill this gap with the friendly combination of distrust and punishment. We focus
on data security and privacy threats emerging from misbehaving collaborators, monitoring their
requests and continuously weighing the risks of the collaboration against the benefits gained from
it. We also propose a combination of technical, social and legal sanctioning when breaches of
contract or policy are detected.
Our contribution is threefold: first, we contribute to the understanding of the modern inter-
enterprise collaboration environment and defense structures in it; second, we identify new threats
to assets such as data and metadata, and new domains of threats created by collaboration that must
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be addressed; and third, we present automated control measures to ensure that actors in inter-
enterprise collaborations behave correctly to ensure data security and privacy beyond our means
to directly control the enterprise partners.
Chapter 2 provides a condensed overview of the ecosystem for inter-enterprise collaboration,
supported by the Pilarcos architecture. Chapter 3 discusses the findings of our threat analysis, and
Chapter 4 presents countermeasures specifically against partner misbehaviour. Finally, Chapter 5
concludes with some environmental requirements for the future.
Chapter 2
Ecosystem for inter-enterprise
collaboration
The Pilarcos architecture views inter-enterprise collaboration as a loosely-coupled, dynamic con-
stellation of business services. The constellation is governed by an eContract that captures the
business network model describing the roles and interactions of the collaboration, the member
services, and policies governing the joint behaviour [15, 17].
The Pilarcos architecture provides a middleware layer with common services for a breeding en-
vironment of new collaborations, and local, enterprise-system services for accessing trusted agents
for managing the entire lifecycle of a collaboration. These services are supported by repositories
of public and private information. Multiple collaborations in different phases of their lifecycle
can run simultaneously within this open service ecosystem. An overview of the open service
ecosystem is depicted in Fig. 2.1.
The management services include 1) service discovery and selection, 2) eContract establish-
ment, 3) monitoring, and 4) experience reporting. They provide support for the four phases of
the collaboration: establishment, agreement, enactment and control, and evaluation. Unlike many
existing proposals [36, 18, 24, 21], collaboration management in the open service ecosystem does
not rely on centralized control of the entire collaboration: participants remain autonomous and
independent of the initiator of the business network. In addition, some of the management support
needed can be offered as services by specialized third parties rather than requiring one ultimately
trusted actor to rule over everything.
Service discovery and selection services support the collaboration establishment phase. It is
based on public business process models describing the collaborations, and public service offers
made by service providers [15, 29]. Business network models capture the best practices of a given
field, and they are built from formally defined service types. The task of producing these models
and types naturally falls to consortia and standardization bodies.
Automated eContract establishment supports the agreement phase of the collaboration [15].
The business process model and the proposed service offers to populate the roles in it are pro-
cessed by an automated contract negotiation infrastructure, which is controlled locally by each
collaboration partner. Contracts are based on templates specific to the collaboration model, and
the terms of service provision given in service offers form the basis of negotiations. The negoti-
ated eContract includes a model of the business process of the collaboration as well as the finalized
terms of service in the form of accepted service offers.
Monitoring supports the enactment and control phase of the collaboration in particular [16]. It
is done by each collaborator to protect local resources, keep track of the progress of the collabo-
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Figure 2.1: An overview of the open service ecosystem.
ration, and to ensure that partners follow the collaboration model.
Experience reporting mainly supports the evaluation phase of the collaboration, although it
also connects to the monitoring service during the enactment of the collaboration [28, 27]. Ex-
perience reporting forms the core of social control in the open service ecosystem. As contract
violations are detected by monitors, they are published to other actors as well: it is important to
create a direct reputation impact to privacy and data security violations in order to limit the damage
that misbehaving actors can achieve in other collaborations.
Chapter 3
Threats
Collaboration with partners, some previously known and some unknown, exposes the enterprise to
security and privacy threats. Threats are targeted towards assets that are either concrete and intan-
gible, such as money, data, contracts, the good reputation of the enterprise and its ability to remain
autonomous and independent of any single dictating partner. The importance of intangible assets
increases in a collaborative setting. While partial efforts in filling the gaps between single system
and enterprise level security exist, for example in the form of message context protection [33],
a thorough analysis of general threats, risks and possible countermeasures in the inter-enterprise
collaboration context has not been previously done [6].
3.1 Threat analysis for inter-enterprise collaboration
We have performed a threat analysis of inter-enterprise collaboration with the open service ecosys-
tem in focus, in order to find threats arising from the structure of the ecosystem that should be
safeguarded against. To ensure a sufficiently broad threat analysis for the generic collaboration
context, we applied the formal threat tree method [2], dividing the target system into views of ac-
tors (member services in a collaboration, members of the community, the possibly external client
receiving the collaborative service, public and private parts of the collaboration management mid-
dleware, and others) and the assets of the community, the enterprises in it and other involved
parties. After compiling lists of what threats each actor can cause towards another actor’s assets
for all selected categories, we classified them and selected specific types of threats for further
analysis in the next section.
As threats and risks arise from multiple levels in inter-enterprise collaboration, it is no longer
sufficient to think of the security of the single technical service:
 On the service ecosystem level, e.g. the metainformation acting as the basis of collabora-
tions is at stake.
 On the collaboration level, e.g. reaching the shared goal may be threatened by participants
not fulfilling their tasks.
 On the enterprise level, e.g. local policy or contract violations need to be protected against,
and the fulfilment of business objectives of the single member enterprise are at stake. These
are reflected on all the services provided by the enterprise.
 On the level of private people, data security and privacy issues are numerous enough to even
have given rise to multiple taxonomies [32, 4].
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The existing solutions for mitigating privacy and security threats to enterprise data must be
extended to protect the metadata around inter-enterprise collaboration as well: for example, while
the open-ended service offers can be more or less public, the negotiated terms of service provision
in the eContract are already more sensitive information. Experience information is particularly
important to protect from distortion, as it not only affects the targeted service, but also inhibits the
other actors’ ability to assess its behaviour, reducing the power of social control [32].
3.2 Threats arising from the structure of the ecosystem
We will now discuss a set of threats that are independent of the specific type of collaboration at
hand, but rather arise from the structure of the open service ecosystem. These include threats
incurred by modelling, false offers of service provision, committing resources to harmful collab-
orations, and partner misbehaviour, such as contract violations. We will present the central coun-
termeasures briefly; a deeper analysis is provided in the next section on three of them: automated
decision-making, monitoring, and reaction to detected breaches.
As business network models and service offers are a focal element for the ecosystem, special
care must be taken with the management of model repositories. Inter-enterprise collaborations are
defined through business network models, defining the roles and interactions in the collaboration,
service types, defining the outward behaviour of the service, and service offers, defining the terms
of providing a service of a given service type.
Many threats to privacy and data security in collaborations arise from structural problems in
business network models and the interoperation of formal service types. Together, these models
define the interactions between services in the collaboration. For example, if the collaboration
model sets a demand for sharing information in a way that violates local policy, there are no safe-
guards deployable at the collaboration enactment time that can allow the collaboration to continue.
Avoiding these threats sets requirements to collaboration modelling, as they are the keystone
of ensuring collaboration-level security. The model repositories store these public models and
distribute them for the purpose of initiating new collaborations. They should perform validation
analysis and consistency checking on new models before accepting them. When breaches to local
privacy policies are detected, they should serve as feedback to the improvement of the models. In
addition, service offers must be verified to match their service type before being accepted into the
public service offer repository, and the sources of the offers must be traceable.
Service offers convey a commitment to provide a service of the given type, with a given,
public set of terms. The central content of a service offer involves setting parameters or negotiable
parameter ranges for providing the service, and the final values are set during negotiations. For
example, the announced price of service provision may be a broad range depending on other
negotiable parameters in the offer, while after negotiations the price is set to a single value which
is no longer publicized outside the collaboration. In the meanwhile, a parameter indicating that
the service supports a specific protocol version can remain both fixed and public.
Service offers can contain false information. Fake offers can be used to enter into negotiations
and discover the terms that competitors would be willing accept for offering their service. In
order to safeguard against this kind of misinformation, service offers must be traceable to whoever
submitted them to the repository, and negative experience reports should be sent out by the other
negotiators to incur a reputation cost to the source of false offers.
A more general threat arises from automation: the enterprise may enter into collaborations that
at odds with its local policies or even put the enterprise assets at risk due to unreliable partners.
The central countermeasure is to set decision-making points, i.e. policy enforcement, before join-
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ing a collaboration, and during its enactment at relevant resource commitment points within the
collaboration. Routine decisions with clear outcomes can be made automatically, while borderline
and unclear cases must be left to a human user.
Partner misbehaviour is the source of a multitude of threats. Causes for misbehaviour are
numerous: besides the partner being downright malicious, their service can be buggy, poorly
designed or subverted by an outside attacker, participating in multiple collaborations may leave
them with conflicts of interest either between collaborations or between a collaboration and local
policy, and in the end they may well wish to optimize their resource use by simply bending the
contract a little. These are all familiar problems from the brick-and-mortar enterprise tradition,
and they will follow us into the ecosystem of modern inter-enterprise collaborations as well.
As partner behaviour can change, the decision-making mentioned above must be based on
up-to-date experience information to take this into account. Sharing experiences globally within
the ecosystem allows enterprises to learn from each others’ mistakes and strengthens the sanctions
from misbehaviour: not only does a contract violation affect the ongoing collaboration, but future
collaborations with other partners as well [26].
Chapter 4
Countermeasures against misbehaving
partners
The guiding principle of operating in the open market is to be ready to enter into new collaborations
in order to reap the gains from them, but to be vigilant bordering on distrustful at the same time
to avoid the pitfalls. When misbehaviour is detected, however, a corrective reaction is needed that
repairs what damage is possible and ensures that the problem does not repeat itself. We present
three central countermeasures against threats involving the misbehaviour of collaboration partners:
automated decision-making to protect enterprise assets, monitoring to detect misbehaviour, and
sanctioning to encourage cooperative behaviour in the future.
4.1 Automated decisions to protect enterprise assets
During the negotiations in the agreement phase of the collaboration and at relevant points during
its enactment, each participant makes local decisions on whether to first join the collaboration in
the first place, and later on whether they wish to continue in it. These decisions are based on
private policy, and a combination of private information about e.g. local valuations as well as ex-
perience information that is globally shared in the ecosystem. The goal is to evaluate whether the
benefits of participation outweigh the risks; particularly the latter evaluation can change during the
collaboration based on new experience information. Borderline and unclear cases cannot be deter-
mined by automation; they are instead forwarded to a human user. This distinction is guided by a
metapolicy defining what kind of situations can be considered routine, with clear outcomes [27].
The decisions are made to protect the assets of the enterprise. In our model, we have defined
assets more broadly than a single monetary dimension would allow, particularly in order to better
support policies directed towards protecting intangible assets, such as the privacy of data and
metadata.
A decision weighs the benefits of the collaboration against the risks. Both are represented as
effects that the considered commitment has on assets. Benefits include the completion of the task
of the collaboration and fulfilment of the enterprise’s goals in it, return of investment, strategical
gain of a new partner or strengthening market share. Of these, only the return of investment can
easily be measured in monetary terms. In addition, any contractual penalties from refusing service
during the collaboration to e.g. a misbehaving partner must be considered as a part of the decision.
Avoiding contracts that are too binding in this sense is an important way to protect the autonomy
of the enterprise.
Risks include not completing the task, loss of money and other committed resources, loss of
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reputation in the eyes of customers or other partners, or loss of privacy, autonomy (in the form of
overly strict contracts or being bound to a single partner) or security (if the collaboration model
enforces poor security practices). Risks are represented both as an impact of the described threat
happening, and the probability of this outcome. The probabilities are extracted from experience
information.
Further details on the information model and algorithms for decision-making are presented in
earlier work [28, 27].
4.2 Monitoring to detect misbehaviour
Monitoring is the responsibility of each participant; there are no all-seeing trusted third parties
present in the open service ecosystem. This also means that unless the business network model
explicitly support it, no single service has complete overview of what goes on in the collaboration.
For example, if a specific collaboration type requires a notary to act as a witness to specific activ-
ities, it must be incorporated as a role in the business process model itself, and a suitable service
provider found to act as the witness.
Monitors control traffic both in and out of the technical service application, which is capable
of varying behaviour. The service provision policy set in the collaboration eContract is enforced
by the monitor, as well as more persistent enterprise policies such as a privacy policy for handling
sensitive data. If the eContract policies are found to be at odds with local policy, the latter overrides
the shared policy.
In terms of the eContract, misbehaviour is defined straightforwardly as anything deviating
from the business process set in the business network model that the eContract stores. Contract-
abiding but “suspicious” behaviour, however, is more difficult to capture; anomaly detection ap-
proaches suffer from false alarms and therefore would be best used under human supervision [34].
The monitor operates in three modes: proactive, active and passive. Proactive monitoring
blocks messages from passing until the analysis is complete. For example determining whether the
service request is authorized in the eContract, as well as the automated decision-making discussed
in Section 4.1, are both incorporated into a proactive monitoring module. Active monitoring does
not block messages, but operates in real time and may produce side effects, such as alerts: for ex-
ample, negative experience reports can be produced immediately when misbehaviour is detected,
while positive reports generally wait until the successful end of a collaboration or a well-defined
part of it. Passive monitoring is used for later analysis that no longer depends on time. It can be
used to for example plot service usage patterns over longer periods.
Monitoring is based on simple rules produced from higher-level policies. For monitoring that
takes place in real time, and blocks the message exchanges between services during analysis,
performance is a real concern. We have considered this both in choosing the decision algorithms
and information models used [27], and in simulation experiments on the monitor infrastructure
itself to ensure the feasibility of this solution.
Based on the results of our threat analysis, we have reimplemented the Pilarcos monitoring
system to be more modular, allowing new rules to be plugged in to a processing tree of interde-
pendent checks. This makes it more straightforward to transform policies with different goals and
from different levels — the business level, community level and service level — into monitoring
rules. We have found that there is an overall need to bring business concepts, which form the lan-
guage of the policy-setters, closer to the technical concepts, which form the language of automated
policy enforcement.
Ensuring that communication between services is done only through contractually authorized
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partners considerably reduces outsiders’ means to attack the information passed between them.
The business services cannot be completely firewalled in on any level, as they must be able to
form these pairwise authorizations freely during collaboration establishment. However, monitors
limit access to the actual technical service application during the enactment of the collaboration.
While this safeguards the service against external attackers, the threat of misuse remains within
authorized peers. The threat can, in the end, only be mitigated through the counterthreat of legal
and social sanctions, including being shut off from further collaborations.
4.3 Sanctioning to encourage cooperative behaviour
When a breach is detected, a sanctioning system must be activated. Sanctions can be divided
into three categories: technical access control, legal sanctions and social pressure. The regular
automated decision-making provides a way to immediately revoke access to a service in case
a partner misbehaves. This safeguards against further damage, but does nothing to the damage
already done.
Contract violations are penalized by law, which generally provides sufficiently harsh monetary
penalties but operates very slowly and, in the meanwhile, does not protect other organizations from
unwittingly collaborating with the miscreant. Technical countermeasures and legal sanctions must
therefore be complemented by social pressure.
Social pressure can be implemented as a form of service reputation based on the experience
reports that are constantly shared among actors in the service ecosystem. Uncooperative behaviour
is punished by a drop in reputation, which discourages other actors from collaborating with the
misbehaving actor.
A reputation system is a form of a sanctioning. Sanctioning institutions have been demon-
strated to carry a clear competitive advantage in the long run [9]. In the absence of centralized
control, punishment is altruistic: it is carried out by peers who do it at a cost to themselves and no
direct benefit. In human behaviour, this cost is balanced out by reputational benefits, which make
just punishers be seen as more trustworthy [3].
Supporting altruistic punishment allows collaborative societies to scale up in size and time. It
is essential that sanctions are not only limited to those who misbehave, but also those who spread
misinformation in the form of forged experiences [8].
In order for the social pressure from reputation to have any effect, persistent digital identi-
ties are needed for the services [26]. On the other hand, strong identity management is already
necessary to enter into legally binding contracts. As creating a legal entity capable of signing con-
tracts carries more cost than generating a simple fake service, this also protects against experience
distortion by a group of generated drone services [7].
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In the recent years, privacy has become an important issue in many areas of computer science,
and a need for supporting it in networked environments has also become very actual [20]. Privacy
aspects for individuals in particular are well present in OECDwork [22, 23] as well as EU directive
level [30].
Several privacy-related architectures have been proposed. These include the use of a medi-
ator [19], enhancing the privacy of web services [12], or different approaches for managing and
enforcing privacy policies [5, 1, 31]. Some of these architectures have also been implemented
as prototypes (e.g., Privacy Injector [5]), or even as commercial products (e.g., the IBM Tivoli
Privacy Manager for e-business —Tivoli software [13], HP Select Access [10] and HP Select
Identity [11]. However, none of these architectures as such is suitable for controlling privacy in
the inter-enterprise collaboration, as they either assume the collaborations to be closed and to form
a single domain of trust, or concentrate on protecting only intra-enterprise privacy.
Our contribution has been to identify the new levels of privacy and data security threats emerg-
ing from modern inter-enterprise collaboration, and presenting countermeasures for threats partic-
ularly poorly addressed in the past: those caused by partner misbehaviour. These countermeasures
are threefold: automated decisions, monitoring and corrective measures when breaches are de-
tected, particularly experience reporting.
The sharing and use of experience information introduces social control into inter-enterprise
collaboration in the open service ecosystem. Shared experiences form a computational equivalent
of reputation: those who are caught misbehaving suffer damage to their reputation, while those
who correctly report this misbehaviour gain positive reputation. The reputation damage, in turn,
warns off other actors to not collaborate with the misbehaver, which limits the overall damage
they can cause. In the long run, misbehaviour must also be sanctioned by law in order to provide a
final deterrent. This requires a new level of legal support for inter-enterprise collaboration, in two
categories.
First, legislation must be modified to support computational agents making legally binding
contractual commitments. It is technically fully feasible to automate contract negotiations based
on contract templates, where the terms of service provision are adjusted to fit all members of the
proposed collaboration. This automation is useless, however, if the resulting contracts are not
legally valid due to having been finalized and enacted by agents. The combination of standardiza-
tion and legislation should eliminate any need of manual pairwise signing of pre-contracts between
all potential partners in the market.
Second, legal support is also needed for the partially as well as fully automated exchange
of experience information on these agents. As these experiences form a reputation for services,
even valid negative experience reports cause an opening for defamation charges, vengeful business
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tactics and even retaliatory negative reports [25].
In order to support straightforward and usable monitoring rules, it is important that the mes-
sage exchanges between services incorporate sufficient information to see what is happening. As
the monitor is not a part of the technical service application but hooks into the messaging inter-
face, it cannot observe the internal state of the service application directly. This should be taken
into consideration when building the business network models and service types that define the
message exchanges.
As enterprise collaborators can reside in different jurisdictions, legal recourse becomes more
problematic when compared to more geographically limited collaborations. However, this is not a
new problem introduced by open service ecosystems, and international collaboration has already
become a reality for many enterprises. Increased support from local legislation and international
agreements will reduce the setup costs and risks of international collaboration, but some level of
location awareness will have to remain as a part of services provided on the Internet as well.
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